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II.
Plaintiff/Appellant

ARGUMENT

Linda Kesting ("Linda")

has an

unsatisfied judgment for

alimony/spousal support. Linda seeks to satisfy her judgment out of Defendant/Respondent
James A. Kesting's ("James") 401(k). ERISA allows otherwise exempt assets to be attached to
satisfy alimony arrearages pursuant to a Qualified Domestic Relations Order ("QDRO"). James
admitted in his Answer to Linda's Complaint that he owed alimony/spousal support. (R., pp. 1113). Since Linda is owed alimony pursuant to the parties' underlying agreement, she can
properly obtain a QDRO under federal law to satisfy her alimony judgment. Nothing in the text
of ERISA or in any case interpreting ERISA is there any indication that an ex-spouse like Linda
cannot obtain a QDRO if the alimony was owed in a non-merged agreement, rather than ordered
by the court in the underlying divorce case.
James cannot bring himself to state the obvious: he owes Linda alimony. An alimony
obligation, like child support, carries with it consequences in many different areas of the law
(taxes, collections, bankruptcy, to name a few). James' arguments ignore the text of ERISA's
QDRO provision and ignore persuasive foreign authority. Linda is an alimony creditor under
Idaho and federal law and should be treated as such. The District Court erred in reversing the
QDRO. This Court should reverse the District Court and affirm the Magistrate Court.

A.

The QDRO Complies with ERISA and Should be Affirmed

The District Court erred in reversing the Magistrate Court's QDRO in this case on the
grounds that it did comply with ERISA.

1

1.

The ODRO "relates to" alimony payments James owes to Linda

First, the parties agree that otherwise exempt assets like James' 40l(k) can be attached to
satisfy alimony/spousal support arrearages via a QDRO pursuant to ERISA. Further, James must
concede he owes Linda alimony pursuant to their Alimony/Spousal Support Agreement and that
consequently Linda has an unsatisfied judgment for alimony. Yet, James argues the QDRO in
this case is "not a judgment which relates to the provision of alimony payments to a former
spouse." This line of argument confuses the analysis. The issue before the Court is whether the

QDRO complied with ERISA's definition of a QDRO, not whether the underlying
Alimony/Spousal Support Agreement or the subsequent judgment for unpaid alimony/spousal
support complies with ERISA's definition of a QDRO. James consistently focuses on the wrong
order throughout his brief.
Under ERISA, a domestic relations order is defined as:
any judgment, decree, or order (including approval of a property settlement
agreement) which - (I) relates to the provision of child support, alimony
payments, or marital property rights to a spouse, former spouse, child, or other
dependent of a participant, and (II) is made pursuant to a State domestic relations
law (including community property law).
29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii)(I)-(II).
The analysis starts with the QDRO signed by the Magistrate Court and later approved by
the Plan Administrator of James' 40l(k). (See Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Plaintiff's
Motion for Entry of Qualified Domestic Relations Order, at Exh. C, augmented by Order of the
Court on July 25, 2015). Is that QDRO a "judgment, decree, or order"? Yes. Does the QDRO
relate to child support, alimony payments, or marital property rights? Yes. Was it made pursuant
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to state domestic relations law? Yes. To hold otherwise would ignore that the QDRO is based on
an unsatisfied judgment for alimony/spousal support. Linda seeks to enforce her right to alimony
payments under the parties' agreement. No underlying order by the court for alimony in the 2009
divorce case is needed or required by ERISA.
There should be no question the QDRO "relates" to alimony payments. James' position
amounts to a denial of the obvious fact that he owes Linda alimony. Linda is not arguing she has
an "absolute" right to alimony under Idaho law, only that the Alimony/Spousal Agreement
created an obligation on James' part to pay Linda alimony. Upon execution of their agreement,
Linda obtained a right to alimony. Separate non-merged agreements for alimony are expressly
permitted under Idaho's decisional domestic relations law. See, e.g., Davidson v. Soelberg, 154
Idaho 227, 230, 296 P.3d 433, 436 (Ct. App. 2013); Terteling v. Payne, 131 Idaho 389, 393-94,
957 P.2d 1387, 1391-92 (1998).
James cites a number of cases that he argues support his position, but none of these cases
address the contract versus order argument at issue in this case. See, e.g., In Re Marriage of Rife,
529 N.W.2d 280 (Iowa 1995); Hogle v. Hogle, 732 N.E.2d 1278 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). These
cases support Linda's position that QDROs can be used to satisfy unpaid alimony. These cases
happen to involve QDROs where there was an underlying court order for alimony and not an
underlying alimony agreement incident to divorce. Yet, to then leap to the conclusion that
therefore ERISA expressly bars alimony creditors who are owed alimony under a separate
agreement is a non sequitur. None of the cases decided the question before this Court. The
usefulness of the cases is to show that QDROs can be issued to satisfy alimony
arrearages/judgments (and not just to divide pensions or retirement accounts).
3

In fact, there has been only decision across the country to rule the way James wants this
Court to rule and that lower court decision was overruled by Pennsylvania's Supreme Court. See

Stinner v. Stinner, 554 A.2d 45 (Pa. 1989). On appeal in Stinner, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court expressly overruled the lower court's decision that because the QDRO was "based on a
property settlement it was rendered 'pursuant to general rules pertaining to the enforcement of
contracts and not by virtue of any domestic relations law." While James stresses that the alimony
is in a non-merged agreement, it is still alimony-a quintessential element of domestic relations
law.
What's more, although James is correct that the decision to not merge the alimony
agreement into the Decree of Divorce means that Linda's right to enforce the agreement rests on
the contract, James stretches this concept too far. The significance of merger versus non-merger
is this:
Merger is the substitution of rights and duties under the judgment or the decree
for those under the agreement or cause of action sued upon." In other words,
when an agreement is merged into a divorce decree, the right to enforce the
contract through an action for breach of contract is supplanted by the divorce
court's authority to enforce its orders. If a settlement agreement has been merged,
the spousal support provisions generally may be judicially modified.

Davidson v. Soelberg, 154 Idaho 227,230,296 P.3d 433,436 (Ct. App. 2013).
Linda does not dispute that she had to sue for breach of contract when James defaulted on
his promise to pay alimony. Neither party can seek judicial modification of the alimony
agreement. Linda cannot pursue a contempt action against James. Beyond these principles, there
is no significance to the merger versus non-merger distinction. Nowhere in the cases is there any
suggestion that Linda cannot avail herself of the benefits the law gives her when it comes to
4

collecting a judgment for unpaid alimony. Both federal and Idaho law permit otherwise exempt
assets to be attached for unpaid alimony without distinction between whether the alimony is
owed pursuant to agreement or ordered by a court. Again, James consistently seeks to ignore that
he owes Linda alimony. He does not simply owe Linda money pursuant to some run-of-the-mill
installment contract.
2.

The ODRO was made pursuant to state domestic relations law

The QDRO was made pursuant to state domestic relations law. First, James misconstrues
Linda's argument. Linda is not arguing she has an "absolute" right to alimony under Idaho law.
Her right to alimony, and James' obligation to pay alimony, was created by the parties in the
Alimony/Spousal Support Agreement. James seems to suggest the agreement did not create an
obligation on his part to pay alimony, yet this is plainly not correct. Separate alimony agreements
are part of Idaho's decisional domestic relations law and parties here availed themselves of that
option in this case.
James states "there is not a state domestic relations law that is applicable to this case."
Under this analysis, no magistrate court has any authority in any case to enter a QDRO. The
words "qualified domestic relations order" do not appear anywhere in Title 32 of the Idaho Code,
although they are addressed in Tile 11. Yet, we know that magistrate courts issues QDROs
routinely and plan administrators accept and process them routinely. James' position is overly
strict and his reasoning has been rejected by the courts. See, e.g., Taylor v. Taylor, 541 N.E.2d
55, 58 (Ohio 1989) (rejecting argument that no QDRO can issue in absence of specific statutory
authorization and noting that ERISA should not be so "strictly construed").
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To hold the QDRO is not based on Idaho domestic relations law is effectively a holding
that there is no alimony owed under the underlying agreement in this case. Such a holding would
create an anomaly in the law whereby parties can agree to alimony, treat it as such for tax
purposes, for purposes of bankruptcy, but yet not for collection purposes. Nothing in ERISA or
Idaho law requires the Court to make such a ruling.
3.

Stinner v. Stinner is directly on point and supports Linda's position

Linda is aware of only one case that has addressed the issue before this Court. That case,
Stinner v. Stinner, 554 A.2d 45 (Pa. 1989), is persuasive and the Court should follow its holding.

James attempts to distinguish the case by arguing the case did not indicate whether the
agreement was merged or not merged. This distinction is a red herring for purposes of
determining whether a QDRO can be issued under ERISA in this case. Nothing in ERISA's text
or legislative history suggests Congress meant to treat ex-spouses differently if they choose to
enter into separate, non-merged agreements for alimony. The non-merger doctrine says nothing
about collecting alimony once a judgment has been obtained.
Further, whether or not in Stinner the agreement was merged or not merged, Stinner
squarely addressed the "contract versus order" argument that James makes to this Court. In
Stinner, the ex-wife sued for breach of an alimony contract. She filed a "complaint in assumpsit

alleging breach of contract" (in addition to an action in equity). 554 A.2d at 47. A complaint in
assumpsit is a common law action for breach of contract. Assumpsit, Black's Law Dictionary
(10th ed. 2014 ). The question Stinner addressed was whether a contractual right to alimony
would support a QDRO. Mrs. Stinner's ex-husband, like James, argued that her right to alimony
was based solely on contract and not Pennsylvania's domestic relations law. Id. The Stinner
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court rejected that "myopic view" of the concept of domestic relations law. Id. at 48.
Pennsylvania, like Idaho, recognized the validity of alimony in a separate agreement. See id.
Mrs. Stinner had a judgment for unpaid alimony due to her ex-husband's breach of the
agreement. Once the validity of separate alimony agreements is recognized, then any order (like
the QDRO in this case) seeking to enforce that judgment is based on decisional domestic
relations law. See id. at 47.
In sum, if the agreement here created an obligation to pay alimony, then Linda is seeking

to collect unpaid alimony. It is only by ignoring the nature of the underlying agreement that
James can make the argument that the QDRO is not based on Idaho's domestic relations law.
James is effectively asking the Court to ignore almost a century of case law in Idaho recognizing
separate, non-merged agreements for alimony. Whether Linda was required to file a breach of
contract action is not material to whether the QDRO is based on Idaho domestic relations law. It
is fundamentally inconsistent to find that James owes alimony, but that the QDRO can somehow
only be issued pursuant to mere contract law.
B.

Consistent with Federal Law, Idaho Law Allows Claims by Alimony
Creditors Against Otherwise Exempt Retirement Assets

First, whether Linda can attach assets in James' 401(k) is a question of federal law. The
dispositive question is whether the QDRO complies with ERISA. To the extent James argues
that LC. § l 1-604A bars Linda from attaching these assets, the statute would be preempted by
ERISA. 29 U.S.C. § 514(a) preempts "any and all State laws insofar as they may now or
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan" covered by the statute. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a);
Afackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 829, 836 (1988). The U.S.
7

Supreme Court has made clear that "state laws which make "reference to" ERISA plans are laws
that "relate to" those plans within the meaning of§ 514(a)." Id. Therefore, LC. § 11-604A, since
it purports to govern how and when ERISA plans may be attached or garnished, is likely
preempted by ERISA. Linda cited LC.§ 11-604A and LC.§ 11-607(1)(a)(l) in her opening brief
because (1) there is no conflict between Idaho law and ERISA and (2) because LC. § 11-604A
and LC.§ l 1-607(1)(a)(l) should be considered part ofldaho's domestic relations law insofar as
they cover the collection of alimony claims, thus supporting the entry of the QDRO in this case.
However, whether the QDRO itself is proper is a question of interpreting ERISA.
However, notwithstanding from the preemption issue, Idaho law is consistent with
ERISA and allows Linda to collect alimony against James' retirement plan-in fact, alimony
creditors are given favored treatment. LC. § 11-607(1 )(a)(l) expressly states that a creditor "can
make a levy against exempt property to enforce a claim for 1. Alimony, support, or maintenance
. . . ." I. C. § 11-607 (1 )( a)(1 ). James argues in a footnote that LC. § 11-607 (1 )( a)(1) is not
applicable and that LC. § 11-604A governs. This is because LC. § 11-607(1) states
"notwithstanding other provisions of this act ... " and I.C. § l 1-604A was not part of the same
"act." This argument ignores that when LC. § 1 l-604A was enacted, LC. § 11-607 was on the
books, yet was never amended.
In other words, if James is correct that LC. 1 l-604A was meant to protect his 401(k) from
alimony creditors, it would be odd that the Legislature would leave LC. § 11-607 undisturbed.
This argument reflects an unduly narrow interpretation of term "act" that would require an
understanding of each particular session law or amendment that comprises Title 11 and when
each was enacted. This would force a disjointed reading of Title 11, as well as every other statute
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that contains the same phrase. Instead, the proper rule is to read the two statutes in pari materia.
See City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Indep. Highway Dist., 139 Idaho 65, 72 P.3d 905 (2003).
Statutes are inpari materia "if they relate to the same subject." Id. at 69, 72 P.3d at 909. Statutes
that are in pari materia "must be construed together to effect legislative intent." Id.
Here, I.C. § 1 l-604A(3) and I.C. § 11-607 are in harmony and support Linda's position.
I.C. § 1 l-604A(3) states that while pensions are exempt from execution, that protection does not
apply to benefits payable to a former spouse "to the extent expressly provided for in a qualified
domestic relations order that meets the requirements for those orders under the plan ...." I.C. §
11-604A(3). While James admits that the "statute does allow for the use of a QDRO along the
same lines as the federal law," James then misreads the rest of the statute to claim the exemption
in the statute only applies "to the extent provided in any order issued by a court of competent
jurisdiction that provides for maintenance or support." Although the QDRO in this case would
still qualify under this definition, this part of the statute is not applicable to the retirement plan at
issue here, which the parties have never disputed is a 401 (k) plan.
A correct reading of I. C. § 11-604 A(3) shows that this section of the statute is phrased in
the disjunctive. The statute states:
This subsection shall permit benefits under any such plan or arrangement to be
payable to a spouse, former spouse, child, or other dependent of a participant in
the plan to the extent expressly provided for in a qualified domestic relations
order that meets the requirements for those orders under the plan, or, in the case
of benefits payable under a plan described in sections 403(b), 408, 408A or 457 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, or section 409 of the Internal
Revenue Code as in effect before January 1, 1984, to the extent provided in any
order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction that provides for maintenance or
support.
I.C. § 11-604A(3) (emphasis added).
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The italicized portion of section (3) is what applies here. The placement of the word "or"
shows that the final sentence is only applicable to plans described in sections 403(b), 408, 408A,
or 457 of the Internal Revenue Code. James' plan is not under any of these sections. Rather, no
one disputes that the retirement at issue here is under section 401(k) of the Internal Revenue
Code.
Therefore, LC. 11-604A(3) actually supports Linda's right to collect her unpaid alimony
against James' 40l(k). Linda has obtained a qualified domestic relations order. I.C. § 11607(1)(a)(l) expressly states that alimony creditors can garnish assets that are otherwise exempt
under other provisions of the act. These statutes should be read in harmony. Read together,
alimony creditors like Linda are authorized to obtain QDROs to levy against otherwise exempt
retirement assets like the 401(k) here. Idaho law not only permits it, but actually favors the
collection of alimony in this situation.
C.

James Failed to File a Timely Cross-Appeal of the District Court's Denial of
his Attorney Fee Request and has Failed to Support his Purported CrossAppeal with any Argument

James identifies as one of his "additional issues presented on appeal" the District Court's
denial of his request for attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121. James has failed to file
a timely cross-appeal and cannot raise this issue. I.A.R. 15 requires a respondent "to file a crossappeal if affirmative relief by way of reversal, vacation or modification of the judgment is
sought." Miller v. Bd of Trustees, 132 Idaho 244, 247-48, 970 P.2d 512, 515-16 (1998).
"Although a respondent can make any argument to sustain a lower court judgment, the
respondent must timely file a cross-appeal in order to seek a change in the judgment." Id.
(quoting Bewley v. Bewley, 116 Idaho 845,847, 780 P.2d 596,598 (Ct. App. 1989) (emphasis in
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original). "In Idaho, a timely notice of appeal or cross-appeal is a jurisdictional prerequisite to
challenge a determination made by a lower court. Failure to timely file such a notice 'shall cause
automatic dismissal' of the issue on appeal." Id. (quoting Carr v. Carr, 116 Idaho 754, 757, 779
P.2d 429,432 (Ct. App. 1989)).
Even apart from this failure to file a timely cross-appeal, James fails to support his
allegation that the District Court erred with any argument or authority. "The failure to support an
alleged error with argument and authority is deemed a waiver of the issue." Idaho Dep't of

Health & Welfare v. Doe, 152 Idaho 263,267,270 P.3d 1048, 1052 (2012). James identified the
issue, but makes no supporting argument in his brief.
D.

James is Not Entitled to Attorney Fees on Appeal

James is not entitled to attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code § 12-121. James states
that Linda is pursuing this appeal "unreasonably and without foundation," yet offers no analysis
and cites no other authority. As the District Court noted, this is a case of first impression in
Idaho. There is no Idaho case on point. Linda's position is directly supported by the only
decision across the country that addresses the argument on appeal. Linda's position is supported
by the text and purpose of ERISA. James' position requires the Court to take a distinct leap of
logic that is not mandated by ERISA or any Idaho case law. Linda has appealed an erroneous
interpretation of federal law and her position on appeal is well-grounded in law and fact.
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III.

CONCLUSION

The District Court's Opinion on Appeal should be reversed and the Magistrate Court's
Judgment of Qualified Domestic Relations Order should be affirmed.
DATED this

\~

day of September, 2015.

COSHO HUMPHREY, LLP

MATT SCHELSTRATE
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
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